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Prepayment Challenges to the
Assessment of Abandoned Mine Land
Fees: United States v. Gorman Fuel,
Inc.
Congress established the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund'
as part of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 (SMCRA), 2 with the intent that monies from the fund be
used for the "reclamation and restoration of land and water
resources adversely affected by past coal mining." 3 The Secretary
of the Interior collects those monies through a production-based
fee imposed upon all coal operators. 4 As with any other section
of SMCRA, the substantive provisions of the AML program
have been a frequent subject of litigation, with judicial opinions
being written upon such things as the definition of a "surface
mining operation;" 5 upon the appropriate distribution of partic-
ular AML monies; 6 and upon the imposition of the fee in several
other unusual situations.7 A recent ruling involving AML liti-
' 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243 (1982).
2 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
1 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c) (1982); see also, Comment, The
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Its Background and Its Effects,
89 W. VA. L. REV. 655 (1987).
" 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1982). This section provides that:
All operators of coal mining operations subject to the provisions of this
chapter shall pay to the Secretary of the Interior, for deposit in the fund,
a reclamation fee of 35 cents per ton of coal produced by surface coal
mining and 15 cents per ton of coal produced by underground mining, or
10 per centum of the value of the coal at the mine, as determined by the
Secretary, whichever is less, except that the reclamation fee for lignite coal
shall be at a rate of 2 per centum of the value of the coal at the mine, or
10 cents per ton, whichever is less.
I See United States v. Kennedy, 806 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1985)(hauling of refuse
pile coal constitutes surface mine operation subject to AML fee).
6 See State of Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(fees collected
from mines owned by or for Indians are distributed to tribe rather than to state).
7 E.g., United States v. Tri-No Enterprises, 819 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1987)(company
which purchased stockpiled coal was liable for AML fees); United States v. Beaird Coal
Co., 825 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1987)(company liable for fees on coal produced at clay
mine); United States v. Brook Contracting Corp., 759 F.2d 320 (3rd Cir. 1985)(reclamation
fee applies only to combustible coal).
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gation procedure,' however, may prove the most beneficial prec-
edent for those wishing to contest their liability for Abandoned
Mine Land or other similar fees.
Nearly all litigation involving AML fee liability has arisen in
one of the following procedural contexts: (1) collection actions
initiated by the United States for the recovery of delinquent
AML fees, 9 or (2) refund actions by coal operators.'0 In fact, in
only one instance prior to 1988 did a coal operator seek a pre-
payment determination as to its obligation to pay an assessed
AML fee." When a Kentucky corporation became the second
party to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in regard to AML
fee liability,' 2 the United States, while apparently having raised
no such objection in the Amerikohl Mining case,' 3 asserted that
such actions were barred 4 under the Anti-Injunction' 5 and De-
claratory Judgment' 6 Acts.
This Comment will first introduce the issues which arise in
determining whether the Anti-Injuntion Act applies to actions
involving AML fees.' 7 Next, the relationship of the Declaratory
Judgment Act to the Anti-Injunction Act will be addressed.' 8
See United States v. Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Ky. 1989). The
Court held that the prohibitions of the Anti-Injunction and Declaratory Judgment Acts
did not bar plaintiff's action seeking (1) a declaration that it was not responsible for
the payment of certain AML fees, and (2) an injunction against the collection of those
fees. Id. at 993.
1 See e.g., Tri-no Enterprises, 819 F.2d at 154; Beaird Coal, 825 F.2d 1471; U.S.
v. E & C Coal Co., 647 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Va. 1986).
10 See e.g., Amerikohl Mining, 16 Cl. Ct. at 623.
" UGI Corp. v. Clark, 747 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1984). UGI's action for judgment
declaring that it did not owe reclamation fees was consolidated with a subsequently filed
governmental action for collection of those fees.
12 Gorman Fuel, Inc. v. Gentile, Civil Action No. 88-57 (E.D. Ky.). Gorman Fuel
initiated Civil Action No. 88-57, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
its liability for AML fees. The United States then filed Civil Action No. 88-173 for
collection of those fees. These two actions were consolidated under Civil Action No. 88-
173. See United States v. Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
11 See supra, note 10.
" See Brief, Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Ky. 1989)(No. 88-173).
is 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982), which provides in relevant part that: "no suit for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person .... (emphasis added)
6 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982), which provides in relevant part that: "In a case of
actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, . . . any
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought." (emphasis added)
17 See infra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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The manner in which these two statutes were interpreted in
Gorman Fuel will then be analyzed.' 9 The Comment will close
by discussing the implications of Gorman Fuel for those desiring
a pre-emptive remedy against the collection of AML-type fees
or taxes.
20
I. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
The express language of the Anti-Injunction Act limits its
applicability to actions involving the assessment or collection of
federal taxes. 21 The United States Supreme Court recognizes that
the purposes of the Act are to permit the Government to assess
and collect taxes alleged due without the burden of judicial
interference, and to require that legal rights to disputed sums be
determined in a refund suit. 22 Thus, regarding whether the Anti-
Injunction Act applies in any particular instance, the first ques-
tion to arise is whether the disputed sum (e.g., an AML "fee")
can be characterized as a "tax."
In National Cable Television Ass'n. v. United States,23 the
Supreme Court identified some of the differing characteristics
of taxes and fees. A tax is a compelled exaction for the public
welfare, while a fee is generally the result of a voluntary act
which entitles an individual to a particular benefit.2 4 Considering
the expressly stated public purposes for which AML fees are
exacted,25 in addition to the various judicial
26 and legislative 27
pronouncements on the subject, it seems well settled that the
19 See infra notes 39-79 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
2, See supra note 15; see generally, Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction
and Application of Anti-Injunction Act (26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)) Prohibiting Suits to
Restrain Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes, 46 L.Ed.2d 932.
22 Enochs v. Williams Packing and Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1; see also Dietrich
v. Alexander, 427 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
z 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
2" Id. at 340-41. See also United States v. River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.
1984), in which the Court concluded that AML fees were taxes due to the public purposes
for which the monies are used. The Court also noted, in contrast, that permit fees were
not in the nature of taxes, since these fees merely give one individual the right to mine.
2 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See e.g., River Coal, 748 F.2d at 1106 ("[W]e conclude it is a tax for the
purposes of sec. 17 of the [Bankruptcy] Act"); United States v. Tri-No Enterprises, 819
F.2d 154, 159 (7th Cir. 1987)(AML fees are a form of excise tax); United States v.
Devil's Hole, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 451 (1982), aff'd, 747 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir. 1984).
25 See e.g., Act of August 3, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, U.S. Code Cong. and
Admin. News (95 Stat.) 593; 123 Cong. Rec. 12655-61 (1975).
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY [VOL. 5:347
AML "fees" are, in reality, AML "taxes." However, while
precedent establishes that the fees are taxes for some purposes,
2
no case prior to United States v. Gorman Fuer9 had decided
whether they were taxes within the ambit of the Anti-Injunction
Act.
In addition to requiring that a federal tax be involved, the
plain language of Title 26 of the United States Code suggests
that the Anti-Injunction Act applies only to those taxes imposed
under the Internal Revenue Code.3 0 Specifically, the Code states
that the provisions of Subtitle F,3 1 of which the Anti-Injunction
Act is a part, "shall take effect on the day after the date of the
enactment of this title and shall be applicable with respect to
any tax imposed by this title.' '3 2 (emphasis added)
II. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
The Declaratory Judgment Act3 originally contained no lim-
itations with respect to federal taxes.3 4 This omission allowed
taxpayers to seek declaratory relief in federal tax matters,35 even
though an injunction would have been unavailable.3 6 Congress
then amended the Act so as to bar declaratory relief in tax
controversies.3 7 The legislative history of the Act thus suggests
that Congress intended it to apply to any action in which the
Anti-Injunction Act would also apply.3
III. THE GORMAN FUEL DECISION
United States v. Gorman FueP9 consolidated three actions:
(1) an action for injunctive and declaratory relief by Gorman
2 See supra note 26; see also Matter of C.M.& C. Coal Co., 33 B.R. 358 (N.D.
Ala. 1983); In Re King, 19 B.R. 936 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
" 716 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
- See 26 U.S.C. § 7851(a)(6)(A) (1982).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 6001-7873 (1982).
32 26 U.S.C. § 7851(a)(6)(A) (1982).
33 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
3, See Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1285 n.II
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
35 Id.
36 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37 Simon, 506 F.2d at 1285 n.1l; see also S. REP. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1939-1 Cum. Bull. (Part 2) 651, 657).
11 See generally, E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 850-57 (2nd Ed. 1941).
39 716 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
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Fuel regarding its liability for unpaid AML fees; (2) an action
by the United States for collection of those fees; and (3) an
action by Gorman Fuel pursuant to the citizen suit provision of
SMCRA/ ° The United States moved to dismiss Gorman Fuel's
action for declaratory and injunctive relief,4' asserting that such
actions attempt to restrain the collection of Federal taxes, and
are therefore prohibited by both the Anti-Injunction 42 and De-
claratory Judgment 43 Acts. Federal District Judge Eugene Siler
denied this motion, holding that (A) although AML fees are
federal taxes, (B) the Anti-Injunction Act applies only to those
taxes imposed under Title 26 of the United States Code, and (C)
the Declaratory Judgment Act is coterminous with the Anti-
Injunction Act." Since Abandoned Mine Land fees are imposed
under Title 30, 41 rather than under Title 26, the Anti-Injunction
and Declaratory Judgment Acts were found to be inapplicable."
A.
Judge Siler first addressed the question of whether the AML
"fee" was really an AML "tax." He quickly dispensed with this
issue by citing the uncontested line of authority which holds that
the fees are taxes for purposes of Bankruptcy proceedings. 47 This
question appears to be closed for argument, given the bank-
ruptcy decisions, 48 the Supreme Court's definition of a tax, 49 and
the public purposes for which AML fees are collected. 0
B.
Despite having determined that AML fees are taxes, Judge
Siler nevertheless held that they were not the type of taxes to
o See id. at 993. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(1982).
41 Id.
42 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1982).
43 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
- Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. at 993.
45 See 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1982).
• United States v. Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. 991, 993 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
41 Id. at 992.
49 See e.g., United States v. River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Devil's Hole, Inc., 747 F.2d 895, 898 (3rd Cir.1984); Matter of C. M.
& C. Coal Co., 33 B.R. 358 (N.D. Ala. 1983); In Re King, 19 B.R. 936 (E.D. Tenn.
1982).
4' See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
SO See supra notes 3 & 25 and accompanying text.
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which the Anti-Injunction Act applies.' This ruling seems con-
sistent with the express language of the Anti-Injunction Act
itself52 and with those provisions of Title 26 detailing the scope
of the Act.53
The United States Supreme Court, in apparently its only
discussion of the question, has also intimated that the Act applies
only to those taxes assessed pursuant to the Internal Revenue
Code.14 Faced with a challenge by various plaintiffs to the im-
position of licensing fees on imported petroleum, the Court,
although not presented the question, declared in a footnote that
the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the action. 5 Having quoted
from this footnote, Judge Siler stated: "While it is true the
Supreme Court did not squarely address the issue of the appli-
cability of the Anti-Injunction Act to taxes outside Title 26, the
language in the quoted passage is explicit, and this Court will
follow it.''56
Ironically, the Supreme Court footnote in Algonquin SNG57
may have been prompted by a brief5" filed on behalf of the
United States by then Solicitor General Robert H. Bork. In this
brief the United States also took the position that the Anti-
Injunction Act applies only to those taxes imposed under Title
26 of the United States Code.5 9 This position was based on
earlier Supreme Court decisions holding that the Act applied
only to assessments of taxes made by Internal Revenue officers
charged with the general jurisdiction of assessing taxes.6 Given
this construction, AML fee litigation would not be affected by
the Anti-Injunction Act since the fees are not collected by an
51 Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. at 993.
52 See supra notes 15 & 21.
11 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
54 Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, 426 U.S. 548 n.9 (1976).
15 Id. In the Court's language:
The Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits brought to restrain assessment of
taxes assessable under the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1939. The
license fees in this case are assessed under neither Code but rather under
the authority conferred on the President by the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974. The fees are therefore not
"taxes" within the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act. (citation omitted)
36 Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. at 993.
11 426 U.S. 548 n.9 (1976).
58 Brief for Petitioners, Algonquin SNG, 49 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1976).
19 Id. at 1273.
See e.g., Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v.
United States, 187 U.S. 447 (1903).
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Internal Revenue officer, but rather by the Secretary of the
Interior.
61
Additionally, the United States has taken the position that
the statute of limitations applicable to the collection of excise
taxes62 does not apply to the collection of AML fees since these
fees are not assessed under the Internal Revenue Code. 6 This
statute of limitations, in language similar to that defining the
scope of the Anti-Injunction Act,M is limited to excise taxes
imposed under Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code. 65 With
but one exception,6 United States Courts have agreed with the
federal government that the collection of AML fees is not gov-
erned by this limitations period. 67 The United States Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit stated the reasoning of these holdings
in the following manner: "[R]eclamation fees are a form of
excise tax. But the fees are imposed by SMCRA, not by Subtitle
D of the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, 26 U.S.C. §
6501(e)(3) is inapplicable to actions to collect delinquent fees.
' '68
Thus, the apparent position of the United States is that AML
fees are taxes within the purview of some sections of Title 26,
but are not governed by other sections of the same title.
Although statutory language69  and Supreme Court
interpretation 7 of the Anti-Injunction Act indicate that it applies
only to Internal Revenue Code taxes, it must be noted that the
Act has previously been used as a bar to actions involving taxes
61 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1982).
62 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(3) (1982).
63 See e.g., United States v. Tri-No Enterprises, 819 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Hawk Contracting, 649 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1985); United States v.
Gary Bridges Logging and Coal Co., 570 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).
6" See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
65 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(3) (1982); see also Tri-No Enterprises, 819 F.2d at 157.
" See United States v. Gary Bridges Logging and Coal Co., 570 F. Supp. 531
(E.D. Tenn. 1983). Here the Court held that AML fees were excise taxes governed by
the limitations period of 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(3). This decision was based upon the
requirement of 30 C.F.R. § 870.16(d) that coal operators maintain records for a six year
period. Id. at 533.
67 See e.g., Tri-No Enterprises, 819 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. E
& C Coal Co., 647 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 846 F.2d
247 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hawk Contracting, 649 F. Supp. I (W.D. Pa.
1985).
Tri-No Enterprises, 819 F.2d at 159.
69 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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assessed outside of the Code. 71 However, this Commentator can
find no instance in which the Court, applying the Act, addressed
the meaning of the statute's limiting language and the Supreme
Court's footnote reference to that language.
C.
Judge Siler further ruled that Gorman Fuel was not barred
under the Declaratory Judgment Act 72 from relief in respect to
AML fee assessments. 73 In so ruling Judge Siler adhered to the
dominant view that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended
to be coterminous with the Anti-Injunction Act.7 4 That is, if a
suit is allowed under the Anti-Injunction Act, then the Declar-
atory Judgment Act cannot act as a bar.75 The Courts which
have declared the two Acts to be coterminous interpreted this
construction to be the intent of Congress76 in amending the
Declaratory Judgment Act. 77 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has yet to offer an opinion on the subject of coter-
minancy. In Alexander v. Americans United8 the Court stated:
"While we take no position on this issue, it is in any event clear
that the federal tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act




United States v. Gorman Fuel0 raises a question of first
impression: Do the Anti-Injunction
' and Declaratory Judgment8 2
" See e.g., Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938)(Title 19 import
duties are taxes subject to Anti-Injunction Act); Moon v. Freeman, 245 F. Supp. 837
(E.D. Wash. 1965)(Duty on wheat exports under Title 7 is a tax within meaning of Act);
Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. 1956)(Title 19 dumping duty subject to
Act).
72 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
13 Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. at 993.
7, See e.g., Perlowin v. Sassi, 711 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983); Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Jules Hairstylists of Maryland v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 511
(D. Md. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.denied, 391 U.S. 934 (1968);
Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (7th Cir. 1942).
11 Perlowin, 711 F.2d at 911; see also Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 506
F.2d at 1285.
76 See Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 506 F.2d at 1285 n.ll; see also, S.
Rep. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1939-1 Cum. Bull. (Part 2) 651, 657).
7 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
7- 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
79 Id. at note 9.
716 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1982).
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Acts prohibit prepayment challenges to the assessment of Aban-
doned Mine Land fees pursuant to the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).
83 The plain language84
and judicial interpretations" of the Anti-Injunction Act, as well
as arguments advanced by the United States government,8 6 coun-
sel that the Act does not apply to the collection of AML fees.
The Declaratory Judgment Act likewise should not apply, since
it appears to be identical in scope to the Anti-Injunction Act.
8 7
Consequently, coal operators who wish to challenge the assess-
ment of AML fees appear to have the choice of initiating action
before payment.
Although this Comment has been limited to a discussion of
whether the Anti-Injunction and Declaratory Judgment statutes
prohibit pre-emptive challenges to AML fee collection, Judge
Siler's opinion was based entirely8 upon the plain language of
Title 269 and the Algonquin SNG footnote. 90 Since the opinion
did not turn upon any particular aspect of SMCRA, it should
be useful precedent not only for those with AML fee disputes,
but also for those challenging any assessment not made pursuant
to the Internal Revenue Code.
Timothy L. Wells
8 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1982).
82 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
13 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1982).
', See supra notes 21, 30-32 and accompanying text.
815 See supra notes 54-56, 66-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 33-38, 72-79 and accompanying text.
88 See Gorman Fuel, 716 F. Supp. at 993 (Judge Siler cited no authority other
than 26 U.S.C. 6501(e)(3) and the Algonquin SNG footnote in support of his holding).
89 26 U.S.C. § 7851(a); see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
o 426 U.S. 548 n.9 (1976); see also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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